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The paper extends existing work on inequality and economic development 
by estimating a cross-country structural model that identifies bi-directional 
relationships between income inequality and other indicators of social and 
economic development. Overall, lower inequality is associated with 
improvements in other development indicators, but this is the result of 
several complex interactions. The most striking feature of the structural 
model is the insight it provides into the reasons behind the negative “Africa 
dummy” in previous cross-country growth studies. 
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1.  The Africa Dummy, Income Inequality and Economic Development 
One of the few consistent findings in empirical cross-country studies of the causes of economic 
growth is that, other things being equal, African countries have lower steady state per capita 
income levels. Easterly and Levine (1997) highlight the high degrees of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation in Africa as one of the reasons for “Africa’s growth tragedy”. Their thesis is that 
ethnic homogeneity promotes the acquisition of social capital; countries lacking such 
homogeneity are less productive because of an absence of social capital. But, as we shall see, 
African countries perform more poorly ceteris paribus, even when development is conditioned 
on ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. In this paper we will argue that in order to uncover more 
fully the reasons for the negative Africa dummy in cross-country income regressions, it is 
necessary to explore the interaction between economic development and social development 
indicators, and in particular measures of education, health and income inequality. We will argue 
that although ethnic homogeneity does explain some of the variation in performance across 
countries, its role is small when compared with other factors. 
  Empirical analysis of the links between inter-household income inequality and economic 
development is one of the oldest genres in development economics, going back at least as far as 
Kuznets (1955). Interest in this topic has recently been revived by the World Bank’s publication 
of better quality data on income distribution than has previously been available (Deninger and 
Squire, 1998). One of the innovations in more recent work on the correlates of income inequality 
is the inclusion of a wide range of development indicators, not just mean income. For example, 
Easterly (1999) presents results using four measures of inequality and 77 other development 
indicators. 
  One of the main criticisms of early empirical work on the link between economic 
development and income inequality is that causality could well run in both directions. The stage 
of economic development a country has reached could affect the structure of income distribution, 
for the reasons outlined in the Kuznets paper.
1 But the distribution of income could also affect 
the level of aggregate income, because credit constraints prevent low-income households from 
carrying out socially efficient investment plans, or because income inequality erodes social 
capital. While early work on income inequality was based on OLS regressions, treating income 
development process, and equations for indicators of inequality are estimated either with lagged 
income, or using an IV estimator. The natural progression from this is to model income and 
inequality simultaneously, in order to form a complete picture of the interaction of inequality 
with income and with other development indicators. Effective development policy in any country 
requires an understanding both of the impact of inequality on income and of income on 
inequality; we will see that these relationships will be particularly relevant to the causes of low 
income in Africa. Section 2 of the paper presents an economic model that allows for this kind of 
simultaneity. Section 3 discusses the result of estimating such a model on cross-country data 
including both African and non-African countries. Section 4 reflects on the implications of the 
results for social and economic development in Africa and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Modelling the Development Process 
In this section we describe the structure of the model estimated in Section 3. The aim is to 
construct a framework in which it is possible to identify the ways in which inequality interacts 
                                                           
1 Briefly, the reasons are (i) investment opportunities in the early stage of the development process are 
limited to a few individuals or regions, so transition from low to middle income status involves a worsening 
of the income distribution; this is followed by improvements in the distribution as rents are dissipated by 
wider access to these opportunities. (ii) Physical capital is a complement to skilled labour and a substitute 
for unskilled labour, so the wage gap between skilled and unskilled grows as the capital stock increases.  2 
with key indicators of social and economic development. The model is based on that of Fielding 
(1999) but extends the model by integrating income inequality into the development process. 
  Much of the recent work on income and inequality has used panel data to estimate 
regression coefficients in income and inequality equations (for example, Deninger and Squire, 
1998; Easterly, 1999). In the tradition of the panel data based empirical models of growth 
evolving from Barro (1991), the growth-inequality relationship is investigated through 
regressions of the form: 
 




gi(t) = b0 + f(yi(t)) + b1⋅xi(t) + vi(t)        (1a) 
 
where yi(t) is per capita income in country i in period t, gi(t) the gini coefficient or some other 
index of inequality, xi(t) is a set of social and economic variables, and {ui(t), vi(t)} residuals. The 
non-linear function f(.) reflects Kuznet's hypothesis that inequality is at first increasing, then 
decreasing in per capita income.  
  One major problem in the interpretation of the coefficients of equations (1) and (1a) is 
that slope parameters are likely to vary across countries: we cannot assume that the interaction of 
income and inequality follows exactly the same pattern everywhere. The goal of pooled 
regression analysis is then to estimate the mean of the distribution of each slope coefficient. But 
if there is any serial correlation in the explanatory variables, then a panel data regression that 
imposes common parameter values across countries will induce serial correlation in ui(t) and 
vi(t). As a result, the fitted coefficients will not represent consistent estimates of the cross-
country average of the true parameter values (Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Lee et al., 1998). The 
potential ways of solving this problem within the panel data framework are quite data-intensive, 
and we will be working with a relatively small data set containing around a hundred countries. 
But consistent estimates of the mean long run slope coefficients can be produced by averaging 
data for each country over time, and estimating the model on a pure cross-section.
2 This is the 
approach that we follow below. 
  The use of cross-sectional data necessitates a different solution to the simultaneity 
problem than is used in panel data work. Instruments must be found to identify equations for 
each of the development indicators, so that a structural model can be estimated. The main 
drawback of the cross-sectional approach is that lags can no longer be used as instruments in 
dealing with the endogeneity as they are in, for example, the panel data studies of Easterly (1999) 
and Caselli et al. (1996). We need to find "real" instruments in order to identify the model. The 
theoretical model that follows provides a basis for the selection of these instruments. 
 
2.1 The theoretical model 
Papers such as Easterly (1999) contain scores of potentially endogenous variables, and it is 
impossible to identify all of the interactions between them using cross-section data. Instead, we 
will identify equations for one measure of inequality and three other indicators of socio-
economic development; the rest of the model is left in reduced form. The four endogenous 
variables appearing in the empirical model are per capita income, education, health and 
inequality. We will first describe a theoretical model suggesting how equations for these four 
                                                           
2 This is proven in Pesaran and Smith (1995). The caveat here is that the parameters will provide estimates 
only of the impact of xi on yi. Any cross-country effects of xj on yi will not be captured.  3 
variables might be identified; next we will deal with measurement issues. The theoretical model 
consists of nine equations. Greek characters are parameters and Roman characters are variables; 
endogenous variables are written in bold. 
 
g: the degree of income inequality 
y: log per capita income 
e: a measure of the average education level 
h: a measure of the average level of health 
k: the log per capita physical capital stock 
a: factor efficiency 
ce: the cost of investment in education, net of its consumption benefits 
ch: the cost of investment in health, net of its consumption benefits 
r: the interest rate 
n: the log per capita natural resource stock 
v: a measure of ethno-linguistic diversity 
m: a vector of variables capturing cultural characteristics 
x: mean annual temperature 
 
The equations are: 
 
The determinants of the degree of income inequality: 
g = ζ0 + ζ1⋅v + [ζ2 - ζ2’⋅y]⋅y + ζ3⋅h + ζ4⋅m + ζ5⋅e        (2) 
ζ1,ζ2,ζ2’ > 0 > ζ3,ζ5 
 
The aggregate production function: 
y = a + α1⋅e + α2⋅h + α3⋅k + α4⋅n        (3) 
1 > α1,α2,α3,α4 > 0 
 
The determinants of factor efficiency: 
a = β0 + β1⋅v + β2⋅g          ( 4 )  
β0 > 0 > β1, β2 
 
A resource constraint: 
θ⋅y = π0 + π1⋅e + π2⋅h + π3⋅k         ( 5 )  
1 > π1,π2,π3 > 0 > π0 
 
The public education decision: 
e = ln(α1) + y - ce          ( 6 )  
 
The cost of education (net of consumption benefits): 
ce = γ0 - γ1⋅v - γ2⋅y - γ3⋅h - γ4⋅m - γ5⋅g + r       (7) 
γ1,γ2,γ3 > 0 > γ5 
 
The public health decision: 
h = ln(α2) + y - ch          ( 8 )  
  4 
The cost of health (net of consumption benefits): 
ch = δ0 - δ1⋅v - [δ2 - δ2'⋅x]⋅x - δ3⋅g - δ4⋅y - δ5⋅e + r      (9) 
δ0,δ2,δ2',δ4,δ5 > 0 > δ3 
 
The private investment decision: 
k = ln(α3) + y - r          ( 1 0 )  
 
Equation (2) indicates the potential determinants of inequality. Cultural factors (m) could 
influence inequality through their impact on social norms, and hence public policy. m includes 
dummy variables for whether the country has ever been a British or French colony: Henderson 
(1991; 1993) argues that countries' colonial histories affect the degree of observance of civil 
rights and other measures of social development; this argument could be extended to the degree 
of observance of economic rights to a basic standard of living. m also includes the reported 
number of Muslims and Christians, as a fraction of the total population: Poe and Tate (1994) and 
Park (1987) argue that religious adherence is a major factor in social development. Ethno-
linguistic diversity is included in the equation because it might increase inter-ethnic inequality, 
giving rise to a greater potential for inter-household inequality. A higher level of health care and 
education might be associated with lower inequality, because they are associated with wider 
access to income-augmenting activities. Finally, the quadratic term in income allows for a 
Kuznets Curve effect. 
  Equation (3) is an aggregate production function in log-linear form. Per capita output 
depends on the physical capital stock, natural resources and two human capital measures, e and 
h. These represent two aspects of the stock of human capital, which depreciate over time because 
of, for example, mortality and disease. Improvements in the stock of health and education might 
generate a higher per capita output level for two reasons. First, they can improve the inherent 
productivity of the labour force. Second, they may reduce fertility rates and so the fraction of the 
population below working age. Without an appropriate instrument for fertility we cannot identify 
these two effects. 
  Equation (4) indicates the factors determining the efficiency of resource use. Easterly 
and Levine (1997) find that greater ethno-linguistic diversity (v) reduces growth, and so we allow 
for this effect in the efficiency function. We also allow for the possibility that the degree of 
income inequality (g) adversely affects efficiency. This effect could work through the formation 
of social capital (Hardin, 1992; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997), or through a 
link between income inequality and credit constraints (Chaterjee, 1991). In the absence of 
appropriate instruments, these links will remain unidentified in our model. The causal chain from 
inequality to economic performance is captured in reduced form, in the parameter β2. 
  The economy's resource constraint is represented by equation (5) above. This equation is 




θ = λe⋅E + λh⋅H + λk⋅K          ( 5 a )  
 
S is total saving,  θ  the elasticity of saving with respect to income, and the λi are rates of 
depreciation for the three types of capital: steady-state investment equals the depreciation rate 
times the capital stock. Letting π1 represent the share of education investment in total investment, 
π2 the share of investment in health, π3 the share of physical capital investment and   5 
π0 = ln(λe)⋅π1 + ln(λh)⋅π2 + ln(λk)⋅π3, the constraint can be written out as equation (5).
3 
Equation (6) expresses an equality between the marginal return to investment in eduction 
and its perceived marginal cost, ce.
4 Education is both a consumer good and a capital good, so ce 
is to be interpreted as the marginal cost of investment net of any consumption benefits that 
accrue to education. Equation (7) includes the possible determinants of ce. Income inequality 
appears in the equation because higher inequality could result in credit constraints that reduce 
education expenditure. Other factors will affect ce through their impact on the perceived 
consumption benefits of eduction. When the income elasticity of demand for education-as-
consumption is positive, higher y will be associated with higher e. Moreover, increases in h 
might lead to a higher e because education and health are complements in consumption. More 
ethno-linguistic diversity might increase the value of education because second-language literacy 
will be more important. We also allow the cultural factors, m, to affect the value placed on 
education. If there are no consumption benefits of education, and no credit constraints, then ce 
will equal the interest rate, r. 
  In equation (8) the marginal return to investment in healthcare equals its marginal cost 
(net of consumption benefits), ch. Equation (9) includes the factors which might determine ch, 
and is analogous to equation (7). The difference between equation (9) and equation (7) is that by 
assumption the value of health does not depend on cultural factors; but the cost of delivering a 
certain level of health does depend on country size and on climatic factors: whether a country has 
a coastline, and the average temperature in the country, x. If extremes of temperature are 
unhealthy, then ch(.) will be non-monotonic in x, and the parameters δ2 and δ2' allow for this. 
  In equation (10) the marginal cost of physical capital (r) equals its marginal return. This 
equation could be adapted to include an efficiency term similar to equation (4) so that there is a 
wedge between the marginal return and the marginal cost, capturing the possibility that capital 
market efficiency is endogenous; but this would not alter the general form of the final equations 
to be estimated. 
  Equations (2-10) can be solved down to a partially reduced form with our four chosen 
variables on the left hand side of four equations: one for income (y), education (e), health (h) and 
inequality (g). The four equations are shown below. 
 
Income: 
y = {β0 + β1⋅v + β2⋅g + [α1 - α3⋅π1/π3]⋅e + [α2 - α3⋅π2/π3]⋅h + α4⋅n}  
× {π3/[π3 - θ⋅α3] }          ( 1 1 )  
 
Education: 
e = {ln(α1/α3) - γ0 + γ5⋅ζ0 - π0/π3 + [γ1 + γ5⋅ζ1]⋅v + [γ4 + γ5⋅ζ4]⋅m  
 +  [γ2 + γ5⋅ζ6 + θ/π3]⋅y + [γ3 + γ5⋅ζ7 - π2/π3]⋅h} ÷ [1 - γ5⋅ζ5 + π1/π3]   (12) 
 
Health: 
h = {ln(α2/α3) - δ0 - π0/π3 + δ1⋅v + [δ2 - δ2'⋅x]⋅x + δ3⋅g + [δ4 + θ/π3]⋅y + [δ5 - π1/π3]⋅e} 
  ÷ [1 + π2/π3]           ( 1 3 )  
 
                                                           
3 Since the πi are less than unity, and the ln(λi) are less than zero, π0 is less than zero. 
 
4 Note that in a log-linear production function, the log of the marginal product of e is equal to the log of the 
average product, (y - e) plus the log of the elasticity of output with respect to e, ln(α1). 
  6 
Inequality: 
g = {ζ0 + ζ5⋅[ln(α1/α3) - γ0 - π0/π3] + [ζ1 + ζ5⋅γ1]⋅v + [ζ4 + ζ5⋅γ4]⋅m  
 +  [ζ2 + ζ5⋅[γ6 + θ/π3] - ζ2'⋅y]⋅y + [ζ3 + ζ5⋅[γ7 - π2/π3]]⋅h} ÷ [1 - γ5⋅ζ5] (14) 
 
y is identified by n.
5 h is identified by x; e and g are identified by m (representing more than one 
variable).
6 e is not be identified in equation (14), nor g in equation (12). Otherwise, there are 
three endogenous variables on the right hand side of each equation. Note that in equation (11) 
dy/de and dy/dh are ambiguously signed. Extra expenditure on health and education (which are 
both consumption and investment goods) increases productivity ceteris paribus. But such 
expenditure also crowds out physical capital investment with a long run savings = investment 
constraint, which leads to lower productivity. Assuming that the realised values of each 
dependent variable in the i
th country are determined by equations of the form of (11-14) plus 
some idiosyncratic residual effect ui, the system can be estimated on a cross-section of countries. 
We will do this using the data described in the next section. 
 
2.2 Measurement of variables in the model 
Since we are going to estimate a cross-section regression, our income variable ought to represent 
a long-run income level. Two alternative measures are the per capita GDP figures reported in the 
Penn World Tables (Heston and Summers, 1991), averaged over time, and the wealth data 
presented in Dixon and Hamilton (1996). The wealth measure is an attempt to capture the current 
present discounted value of human, physical and natural resource capital in each country of the 
world, i,e., per capita permanent income. The tables below report the results of using the latter, 
but results for the former are broadly similar, and are available on request. 
  The stock of education might be measured in a number of ways. The approach of Barro 
and Lee (1993), based on years in school, delivers the most sophisticated figures available. 
However, the range of countries in the sample is quite small, and the authors make strong 
assumptions about the relative quality of schooling in different countries. This paper employs a 
more basic measure instead: the percentage of the adult population that is literate. This approach 
allows the inclusion of a wider range of countries in the sample; moreover, literacy is a direct 
measure of one aspect of human capital, rather than a measure based on inputs into the 
production of education. The data are current literacy rates taken from UNESCO (1998). The 
measure of health used in the model is current (log) life expectancy at birth which, along with the 
measure of the value of natural resources, is taken from the Dixon and Hamilton dataset. 
  The ethno-linguistic diversity measure comes from Krain (1997). This measures the 
probability that two individuals selected randomly from a country's population will speak the 
same native language. It is the most recent and comprehensive measure of ethno-linguistic 
diversity available. Temperature data (in tenths of degrees centigrade) come from Hoare (1998). 
For large countries, the temperature figures used are averages over several large population 
centres, and for small countries the temperature in the capital city; further details are available on 
request. Information on colonisation by Britain or France is taken from CIA (1997), and the 
fraction of the population that is Christian or Muslim comes from Grimes (1996). 
  The measure of income inequality is the gini coefficient taken from the data set of 
Deninger and Squire (1998), using only the "high quality" data they collate. For each country, the 
most recent year's gini is used. We will measure the coefficient on the interval [0,1]. With data 
                                                           
5 As long as n, the value of natural resources - including land fertility - is measured accurately enough, 
temperature ought not to affect output independently of n. 
6 Conceivably, a country’s colonial history might affect economic efficiency (for example by influencing the 
degree of literacy in French or English). But colonial dummies were insignificant when added to the income 
equation. Even with colonial dummies in the y equation, e and g are still identified by the religion variables.  7 
drawn from these disparate sources, there are 95 countries in our data set, of which 26 are in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. These are listed in Appendix Table A1. The sample means and standard 
deviations of all continuous variables are reported in Table 1. The measures of each variable are 
summarised as follows. 
 
y: log per capita wealth in $  
e: the fraction of the adult population that is literate 
h: log years' life expectancy 
g: gini coefficients taken from the dataset of Deninger and Squire (1998) 
n: the log per capita natural resource stock in $ 
v: Krain's measure of ethno-linguistic diversity 
m: GBR (dummy for British colonies); FRA (dummy for French colonies); CHR (the fraction of 
the population that is Christian; MUS (the fraction of the population that is Muslim) 
x: mean annual temperature in 0.1 degrees centigrade  
 
Our regression equations also allow for the possibility that the ui for each equation are spatially 
correlated: that is, that there are still unobservable characteristics in our model that affect 
economic development, and that are not randomly distributed across the globe. The equations 
include the regional dummies EUR (Europe), SAM (South and Central America), AFR (Africa), 
MDE (Western Asia) and ASP (the rest of Asia and the Pacific); the baseline intercept in the 








variable     mean         s.d. 
ln(e/(1-e))   -0.392     2.043 
y      10.41     1.703 
ln(g/(1-g))     0.410     1.875 
h      4.146     0.177 
v      0.430     0.282 
n      8.545     1.794 
x    186.45     71.74 
CHR       0.558               0.380 
MUS       0.213               0.345 
 
Correlation matrix 
                 ln(e/(1-e))   y            ln(g/(1-g)) 
y            0.796 
ln(g/(1-g))      -0.377        -0.259 






3. Estimation Results 
In this section we present the results of estimating equations (11-14) by 3SLS (using TSP 4.4). 
Since our measure of education (the literacy rate) cannot be normally distributed, all  8 
observations lying on the interval [0,1], the estimates of the parameters γi in equation (12) are 
based on a logistic regression, i.e., 
 
e = [1 + exp(-Σγi⋅Xi)]
-1 + error                       (12a) 
 
Since many of the literacy rates for industrialised countries are 99-100%, this does make a small 
difference to the estimated results. The same transformation is applied to the gini coefficient, 
which is also bounded, but here there is virtually no difference from a linear regression, since 
there are few observations anywhere near zero or unity. When the literacy and gini figures appear 
on the right hand side of an equation, they are entered as ln(e/(1-e)) and ln(g/(1-g)). 
  Appendix Table A2 reports the results of the unrestricted estimation of the system. These 
are not discussed in detail: the regressions are over-parameterised and hardly any variable is 
statistically significant. Table 2 reports the model specification that minimises the Akaike 
Information Criterion when each of the estimators is used, and it is this that we discuss in detail. 
The table lists estimated coefficients and associated standard errors, information criteria, 
equation R²s and σs, and tests for heteroskedasticity. There is heteroskedasticity in some of the 
equations, and the standard errors have been corrected using the technique of White (1980). The 
tables also report the product of each continuous explanatory variables' coefficient and its sample 
standard deviation, as a rough indicator of its relative importance. 
The first equation, for income, shows that increases in inequality, as measured by the 
gini coefficient, lead directly to lower average income levels. A one standard deviation increase 
in the gini (i.e., an increase of just under ten percentage points) reduces average per capita 
income by 35-40%. The estimated parameter on the gini coefficient is -1.213. There is also an 
indirect effect on income through life expectancy: inequality reduces life expectancy, and this 
reduces per capita income. The combination of direct and indirect effects increases magnitude of 
impact of the gini coefficient on income to an elasticity of -2.074. This represents and effect 
substantially smaller than the equilibrium effect of the gini coefficient on income implicit in 
Deninger and Squire (1998, Table 3, Column 1), which is equal to -15.6. This figure is the result 
of an OLS estimate using GDP figures for per capita income, the income gini not being lagged.
7 
Table 2 also shows causality running in the opposite direction, with a Kuznets Curve for 
income inequality illustrated in Figure 1. The curve in Figure 1 is based on the estimated 
coefficients on y and y² in the gini regression equation.
8 The turning point is very close to the 
sample log-mean and median per capita permanent income (10.41 and 10.34: in levels $33,190 
and $31,000). At the mean value of y, d(ln(g/(1-g))/dy is equal to -0.006; this figure is not 
significantly different from zero. Two standard deviations below the mean, the figure is 0.275; 
two standard deviations above then mean, it is -0.264.  
  Some of the other coefficients in the income equation, indicating the impact of the 
exogenous explanatory variables, suggest effects that are qualitatively similar to effects found in 
previous studies. A one standard deviation increase in the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation 
measure is associated with an estimated reduction in income of 18.6%. The estimated 
coefficients are very close to those reported in Easterly and Levine (1997). Also, there is a strong 
relationship between income and natural resource endowments, with a one standard deviation 
increase in endowments generating a 94.1% increase in income. One striking result is that whilst 
increased life expectancy leads to a much higher per capita income level, with a one standard 
                                                           
7 Comparison of our results with those of Deninger and Squire is complicated by the fact that their 
explanatory variable is g, and ours is ln(g/(1-g)). But the effect of g on y in our model is smaller than that of 
Deninger and Squire for all observed values of g. 
 
8 The curves are drawn holding all of the dummy variables in the regression equal to zero.  9 
deviation increase in h resulting in a 174% increase in y, higher literacy is associated with lower 
income  per capita. One explanation for this is that education expenditure crowds out more 
productive investment in physical capital. But this does not imply that too much is spent on 
education, since education is also a consumption good; and it is still the case that higher income 
levels lead ceteris paribus to higher levels of education (see below). 
  However, one major difference between our results and those of previous studies is in 
the role of the Africa dummy. This dummy has a significantly positive coefficient in the income 
equation in our estimates. This contrasts starkly with the negative effect in other growth 
regressions, for example in Easterly and Levine (1997). The difference is explained by the 
appearance of significant Africa effects in the gini and life expectancy equation. Ceteris paribus, 
African countries have a lower life expectancy and a poorer income distribution, which worsens 
economic performance. Solving out the four equations, the net impact of being in Africa (starting 
from the sample mean income level) would be to reduce a country's income by 242%. African 
countries are not unusually inefficient, given their socio-economic conditions, but they are 
unusually unhealthy and unusually inequitable. 
  The Africa dummy is not the only significant regional effect on income distribution. 
There is a significantly negative coefficient on the Europe dummy in the gini equation. Europe 
has a more equitable income distribution relative to the developing world (and relative to North 
America and South East Asia) than can be explained by its income level, or by any other 
characteristic in the model. Similarly, countries that have been British or French colonies have 
more equitable income distributions. The British colonisation effect is estimated to be around 17 
percentage points, the French around 25. 
Life expectancy is reduced by greater income inequality: a one standard deviation 
increase in the gini coefficient reduces life expectancy by 3.6%. Redistribution of income to poor 
improves the overall health of a country. Life expectancy also varies with climate: there is a 
significant negative quadratic relationship between health and mean annual temperature. Life 
expectancy is highest in temperate climates, at an average temperature of 19.3
O.  
The variable with the largest impact on life expectancy, however, is the literacy rate. A 
one standard deviation increase in literacy increases life expectancy by around 17%. Better 
education may improve standards of hygiene, or may be associated with lower fertility (and 
therefore infant mortality) rates. In the absence of appropriate instruments, it is not possible to 
identify these effects. There is a virtuous spiral between health and education, since a higher life 
expectancy increases literacy rates. The impact of a one standard deviation increase in life 
expectancy is roughly the same as that of a similar increase in income: both result in values of 
ln(e/(1-e)) that are around 50-60% higher. 
 
4. What do the Results tell us about Africa? 
Table 2 highlights a number of independent variables that are important in the development 
process: ethno-linguistic diversification, natural resource allocation, colonial history and climate. 
Part of the explanation for Africa’s poverty lies in these variables. But even after we have 
conditioned on these variables, Africa’s performance is still unusually poor with respect to health 
and income inequality, as indicated by the significance of the Africa dummy in the Table 2 
equations for these variables. In this section we will first of all assess the magnitude of the extent 
to which under-development in Africa is explained by the independent factors, those that are 
beyond the control of any policy-maker. Then we will investigate further the possible reasons for 
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  Table 2: 3SLS Model Estimates (White-Corrected Standard Errors) 
 
variable       coeff.     std. err.    |t-ratio|    p-value   coeff.×s.d. 
y equation (linear) 
intercept*100    -0.34250      0.10816      3.16671  [.002]      ---- 
ln(e/(1-e))    -0.46252      0.23353      1.98058   [.048]     -0.94 
ln(g/(1-g))    -1.21267      0.36651      3.30866  [.001]     -2.27 
h               9.82941      2.62768      3.74072  [.000]      1.74 
v               -0.66116      0.39536      1.67232   [.094]     -0.19 
n               0.52432      0.08611      6.08867   [.000]      0.94 
AFR             0.82706      0.29255      2.82710   [.005]      ---- 
MDE             -0.77779      0.34004      2.28735   [.022]      ---- 
R² = 0.74577; σ = 0.86814; LM heteroskedasticity: χ²(1) = 1.00691 
 
e equation (logistic) 
intercept*100   -0.13124      0.02922      4.49144   [.000]      ---- 
y             0.38006      0.12972      2.92975   [.003]      0.65 
h               2.72442      0.97748      2.78719   [.005]      0.48 
MUS             0.90488      0.17821      5.07772   [.000]      0.31 
GBR         -0.29143      0.16256      1.79277   [.073]      ---- 
FRA         -0.65187      0.19775      3.29637   [.001]      ---- 
R² = 0.85586; σ = 0.08784; LM heteroskedasticity: χ²(1) = 9.57087 
 
g equation (logistic) 
intercept*100     0.04746      0.02160      2.19775   [.028]      ---- 
y                0.82905      0.40814      2.03129   [.042]      1.42 
y²              -0.03854      0.01879      2.05147   [.040]     -0.11 
CHR             0.31671      0.10270      3.08393   [.002]      0.12 
GBR            -0.16544      0.06845      2.41714   [.016]      ---- 
FRA             -0.24587      0.09258      2.65587   [.008]      ---- 
EUR             -0.62100      0.09477      6.55290   [.000]      ---- 
AFR              0.39144      0.08226      4.75857   [.000]      ---- 
R² = 0.59002; σ = 0.06193; LM heteroskedasticity: χ²(1) = 1.16641 
 
h equation (linear) 
intercept*100     0.33379      0.01692     19.73280   [.000]      ---- 
ln(e/(1-e))      0.09058      0.00992      9.12935   [.000]      0.19 
ln(g/(1-g))     -0.08763      0.04268      2.05305   [.040]     -0.16 
x/1000            7.34944      1.71228      4.29219   [.000]      1.37 
x²/1000          -0.01901      0.00445      4.26739    [.000]     -0.66 
AFR             -0.08563      0.02734      3.13222   [.002]      ---- 
R² = 0.75543; σ = 0.09178; LM heteroskedasticity: χ²(1) = 0.47681 
 
Schwartz-Bayesian Criterion = 0.74228; Hannan-Quinn Criterion = 0.29371 
Akaike Criterion = -0.01044; Log-likelihood = 113.9841 
 
  Table 3 illustrates Africa’s some geographical characteristics relative to the rest of the 
world: it has fewer natural resources per capita, it is hotter, and it suffers from greater ethno-
linguistic diversification, all of which directly or indirectly affect per capita income. The table 
also illustrates the likely magnitude of these effects on income, using the coefficients of the 
model reported in Table 2. The final row of Table 3 indicates the percentage increase in per 
capita income above the African average that the Table 2 model predicts would result if each of 
the three characteristics (natural resource endowment, climate and ethno-linguistic diversity) 
were changed from the African average to the North American average. The figure for ethno-
linguistic diversity is around 10%; the figure for natural resources is over 100%. So ethno-
linguistic diversity does matter, as Easterly and Levine (1997) point out, but its effect is dwarfed 
by the natural resource effect. The figure for climate is negative, since average temperatures in 
Africa are closer to the optimum for health than in those in North America. A final point to be 
made about Table 3 is that although colonial history does have a significant indirect impact on 
economic development, Africa was not particularly heavily (or lightly) colonised by Britain or  11 
France, relative to other parts of the world, so the colonisation variables do not explain African 
under-performance. 
 















  However, the significant Africa dummies in the equations for life expectancy and the 
gini coefficient in Table 2 indicate that these observed natural characteristics do not completely 
explain poor African economic performance. In the case of income inequality we have no direct 
evidence to bring to the question of why the Africa dummy is significant. One speculative 
explanation, which remains to be tested, is that war and civic strife inhibit income redistribution. 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) demonstrate that Africa has been more prone to civil wars than other 
parts of the globe. This is partly due to low income, but may also be partly due to historical and 
political factors. 
  With respect to life expectancy, there do exist some descriptive statistics that shed light 
on Africa’s under-performance. These are summarized in Table 4. The first part of the table 
reports coefficients from an OLS regression equation for the variable h. The key explanatory 
variables in the regression are the fraction of the population of each country with access to safe 
water, the fraction with access to sanitation, and the log of the number of physicians per 
thousand people. 
9(The regression also includes independent variables from the model in Table 2, 
but the coefficients on these are not reported.) It is important to note that the equation does not 
                                                           
9 The data for these three variables are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators. These 
data are available for a sample of 95 countries that is not identical to the sample for the Table 2 regression, 
but which contains countries from each continent in a proportion insignificantly different from in the 
original sample.  12 
necessarily capture the magnitude of the impact of, for example, an increase in the number of 
doctors on life expectancy, since the number of doctors might be endogenous to national income, 
and we know that income depends on life expectancy. However, it does at least show how life 
expectancy is correlated with a number of key inputs in the production of health. There is a large 
and significant correlation between all three of the inputs and life expectancy. The partial R²s on 
access to safe water, sanitation and physicians per 1000 are, respectively, 0.10, 0.18 and 0.17. 





Table 3: Regional Means of Some Independent Variables in the Model 
 
region        natural      climate    ethnic  % of region % of region  
    resources     (0.1
O C)  diversity  colonised   colonised   
    (log $pc)              (% figure) by Britain  by France 
 
EUROPE      9.53        99.88      21.3        8.3        4.7 
N. AMERICA    11.35       123.00      50.7       66.7       33.3 
S. AMERICA     8.84       212.00      45.1       31.6        5.3 
AFRICA      7.92       236.38      66.5       50.0       46.2 
MID-EAST      8.19       172.00      28.2       40.0       60.0 
ASIA-PAC.      7.44       217.39      38.6       50.0       11.1 
 
Table 2  




  A striking aspect of the regression equation is that the coefficient on the Africa dummy 
in the OLS regression (not reported in the table) is only -0.04 (compared with  -0.09 in the h 
equation in Table 2). The t-ratio is only -1.26: ceteris paribus, life expectancy is not significantly 
lower in Africa than it is in North America. This suggests that most of the Africa dummy effect 
in Table 2 is associated with low levels of the three health input variables in Table 4, or of other 
inputs correlated with these. The second half of Table 4 lends support to this conjecture: the 
means of the three variables (conditioning on the set of independent variables) are significantly 
lower in Africa than in North America. For all three health variables the means are lower in 
Africa than in any other part of the World. 
In other words, the poor health outcomes in Africa are closely associated with low 
standards with respect to key health inputs. Some of the under-performance could be related to 
geographical factors. The costs of providing access to safe water and sanitation are likely to 
depend on local geography (on aridity, for example). In the absence of data for unit costs in the 
provision of health inputs, it is not possible to explore the reasons for Africa's poor performance 
in any more quantitative detail. Nevertheless, the results here indicate that better health provision 
is likely to be a key condition for any future improvement in Africa's economic performance. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
This is the first paper (to our knowledge) to use cross-country data to estimate simultaneously the 
relationship between income inequality and other indicators of development. The overall picture 
is that there is a correlation between reductions in inequality and improvements in development 
indicators such as per capita income, literacy and life expectancy (Table 1). Table 2 indicates 
that this correlation is the result of a causal relationship running from income inequality to  13 
average income and life expectancy. Inequality reduces the average material wellbeing of a 
country. Inequality itself is dependent on average income levels, in the form of the Kuznets 
Curve relationship, although the sensitivity of inequality to income is estimated to be lower than 
is suggested by some previous studies. At very high income levels, the negatively sloped part of 
the Kuznets Curve reinforces the negative correlation between inequality and other development 





  Table 4: Significant Correlates of Life Expectancy 
 
Conditional correlation of h with health variables 
Variable            coeff.         std. err.        t ratio  
safe water         0.14598          0.04739          3.081       
sanitation         0.16170          0.03751          4.310       
ln(doctors/1000)     0.03153          0.00764          4.127       
 
Conditional regional means of health variables (with standard 
deviations) 
area         safe water       sanitation       ln(doctors) 
North America     0.66 (0.20)      0.66 (0.26)      0.04 (1.00) 
European difference  -0.04 (0.11)     -0.13 (0.14)     -0.11 (0.55) 
S. American difference  -0.17 (0.11)     -0.26 (0.14)     -0.11 (0.53) 
African difference  -0.28 (0.11)     -0.30 (0.14)     -1.59 (0.53) 
Mid-East difference  -0.22 (0.13)     -0.19 (0.17)     -0.92 (0.63) 
Asia-Pacific difference -0.14 (0.11)     -0.16 (0.14)     -0.78 (0.54) 
  
 
The estimated model also sheds new light on the sources of poor economic performance 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Part of Africa’s poverty is due to exogenous geographical characteristics, 
including natural resource endowment and (less importantly) ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. 
This part of the story is more pessimistic, since there is little Africa can do to change its 
geography. However, there is also a source of optimism. Some of Africa’s growth deficit is due 
to unusually poor performance with respect to health and income distribution, even when the 
geographical factors have been taken into account. Descriptive statistics suggest that this poor 
performance is at least partly due to under-expenditure on public goods, a characteristic that can 
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  Appendix Table A1: Countries in the Sample 
   with their Wealth Rankings in the Dixon-Hamilton Data Set and Gini Coefficients 
 
 
    country     wealth    gini        country     wealth    gini        country     wealth    gini 
                  rank                              rank                              rank 
 
    Ethiopia         1   0.442        Mauritania      58   0.378        Chile          128  0.5649 
    Nepal            2  0.3006        Philippine      59    0.45        Trinidad       129  0.4172 
    Malawi           4    0.62        Romania         65  0.2866        Yugoslavia     130  0.3188 
    Uganda           5  0.4078        Guatemala       66  0.5906        Mexico         131  0.5031 
    Tanzania         6   0.381        Morocco         67   0.392        Guyana         133  0.4022 
    Viet Nam         7  0.3571        C.A.R.          68    0.55        Puerto Rico    144  0.5086 
    Guinea Bissau   10  0.5612        Peru            69  0.4487        South Korea    149  0.3364 
    Bangladesh      12  0.2827        Ecuador         70    0.43        Portugal       152  0.3563 
    Niger           13   0.361        Dom. Rep.       71    0.49        Greece         153  0.3519 
    Burkina Faso    15    0.39        Jordan          72  0.4066        Botswana       162  0.5421 
    Gambia          16    0.39        Syria           75  0.4204        New Zeland     163  0.4021 
    Kenya           17  0.5439        Bulgaria        77  0.3442        Ireland        164   0.346 
    Mali            18    0.54        Lithuania       80  0.3364        Bahamas        165  0.4529 
    Nigeria         19  0.3747        Colombia        82  0.5132        Spain          168  0.2591 
    India           20  0.3202        Algeria         87  0.3873        Hong Kong      169    0.45 
    Madagascar      21  0.4344        Tunisia         93  0.4024        Singapore      170    0.39 
    China           31   0.378        Slovakia        95   0.215        Britain        171   0.324 
    Laos            32   0.304        Turkey          96  0.4409        Finland        172  0.2611 
    Pakistan        33  0.3115        Thailand        97   0.515        Italy          173  0.3219 
    Ghana           35  0.3391        Costa Rica     102  0.4607        Netherlands    174  0.2938 
    Nicaragua       37  0.5032        Guinea         104   0.404        Belgium        175  0.2692 
    Djibouti        39   0.381        Iran           105   0.429        Germany        178   0.322 
    Sri Lanka       42   0.301        Panama         109  0.5647        France         180  0.3491 
    Honduras        43    0.54        Jamaica        110  0.3792        U.S.A.         181  0.3794 
    Lesotho         44  0.5602        Brazil         113   0.596        Norway         182  0.3331 
    Senegal         45  0.5412        Mauritius      114  0.3669        Denmark        183   0.332 
    Cote d'Ivoire   46    0.38        Poland         116  0.3306        Sweden         187  0.3244 
    Egypt           47    0.32        Czech Rep.     117  0.2826        Japan          188    0.35 
    Zimbabwe        49  0.5683        Malaysia       121  0.4835        Luxembourg     190  0.2713 
    Indonesia       52  0.3169        Venezuela      123  0.5384        Canada         191  0.2765 
    Zambia          53   0.524        South Africa   124   0.623        Australia      192  0.4172 
    Cameroon        55    0.49        Hungary        126  0.2794  16 
Appendix Table A2: The Unrestricted Model 
 
variable       coeff.      std. err.     t-ratio    p-value 
 
y equation (linear) 
intercept    -26.12330      11.89890     -2.19544     [.028] 
ln(e/(1-e))        -0.25417       0.30479     -0.83392     [.404] 
ln(g/(1-g))        -1.06242       0.59345     -1.79025     [.073] 
h            7.91418       2.85954      2.76764     [.006] 
v           -0.85604       0.44142     -1.93928     [.052] 
EUR           -0.28202       0.46669     -0.60429     [.546] 
SAM           -0.18766       0.41160     -0.45593     [.648] 
AFR            0.61228       0.55542      1.10237     [.270] 
MDE           -0.63600       0.45627     -1.39391     [.163] 
ASP           -0.06039       0.29811     -0.20257     [.839] 
n            0.48959       0.09435      5.18927     [.000] 
 
e equation (logistic) 
intercept        -11.32590       6.84444     -1.65476     [.098] 
y            0.35096       0.14950      2.34756     [.019] 
h            2.36730       1.88472      1.25605     [.209] 
v            0.26624       0.48085      0.55368     [.580] 
EUR            0.50257       0.65022      0.77292     [.440] 
SAM           -0.56103       0.62398     -0.89913     [.369] 
AFR           -0.40658       0.68366     -0.59470     [.552] 
MDE           -0.13428       0.69432     -0.19340     [.847] 
ASP           -0.21137       0.65601     -0.32221     [.747] 
CHR            0.17564       0.40955      0.42886     [.668] 
MUS           -0.92417       0.44105     -2.09536     [.036] 
GBR           -0.25043       0.21768     -1.15045     [.250] 
FRA           -0.63453       0.23684     -2.67920     [.007] 
 
g equation (logistic) 
intercept         -0.65609       4.07290     -0.16109     [.872] 
y            0.61096       0.65816      0.92829     [.353] 
y²           -0.02685       0.03042     -0.88244     [.378] 
h           -0.74222       1.10200     -0.67352     [.501] 
v           -0.14691       0.17097     -0.85924     [.390] 
EUR           -0.49852       0.12692     -3.92795     [.000] 
SAM            0.19090       0.17395      1.09743     [.272] 
AFR            0.40916       0.26895      1.52133     [.128] 
MDE            0.34109       0.22842      1.49322     [.135] 
ASP            0.03322       0.16019      0.20735     [.836] 
CHR            0.24122       0.13415      1.79817     [.072] 
MUS           -0.20021       0.19830     -1.00962     [.313] 
GBR           -0.14326       0.08249     -1.73662     [.082] 
FRA           -0.25880       0.09234     -2.80272     [.005] 
 
h equation (linear) 
intercept          2.72468       0.66774      4.08042     [.000] 
ln(e/(1-e))         0.05895       0.04122      1.43014     [.153] 
ln(g/(1-g))        -0.15604       0.10203     -1.52930     [.126] 
y            0.03132       0.03442      0.90973     [.363] 
v            0.02893       0.08760      0.33029     [.741] 
EUR            0.06524       0.10414      0.62652     [.531] 
SAM            0.08344       0.07183      1.16175     [.245] 
AFR           -0.04969       0.08757     -0.56739     [.570] 
MDE           -0.00983       0.10332     -0.09513     [.924] 
ASP            0.01741       0.06591      0.26414     [.792] 
x/1000         10.79000       0.50400      2.13982     [.032] 
x²/1000         -0.02844       0.01364     -2.08515     [.037] 